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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates the dynamics of the Euro/US dollar exchange rate before, during and after 
the global financial crisis using intra-day data in a sample covering the period 2003-2011. The 
paper extends over the conventional empirical framework and specifies an EGARCH (3,1) model 
to account for heterogeneity in three temporal trading zones and for asymmetric volatility to news. 
The findings indicate the presence and evolution of differences in Euro/US exchange rate 
dynamics across American, European and Asian trading zones before and during the financial 
crisis. As a result of the crisis, traders in the three areas have modified their reactions to scheduled 
news, unscheduled surprises, and content of policies. Developing a better understanding of how 
traders' behaviour has adjusted since the onset of the crisis is an important issue given the global 
significance of this exchange rate and the considerable volatility experienced over the sample 
period. 
  
Keywords: exchange rate, macroeconomic announcements, unscheduled news, market reaction, 
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1. Introduction 
 
This study investigates the dynamics of the intra-daily fluctuations of the Euro/US Dollar 
exchange rate before and after the global financial crisis during the 2003-2011 period by 
adopting an EGARCH-type methodology and an intra-day news model.1 These kinds of 
methodology and of theoretical framework have both been implemented popularly within 
the literature to study the fluctuation of the Euro-Dollar over periods of relative 
calmness.2 However, the financial crisis of the 2007-2008, has affected the volatility of 
the Euro-Dollar and changed traders’ perceptions and trading behaviours, making it 
important to assess the extent of these changes. 
One of the novelties of our approach is that we use a unique intra-day data frequency 
stemming from partitioning the global trading day into three geographical and temporal 
trading areas. This approach enables us to match more accurately news’ releases and 
trading zones and to identify some interesting differing styles of trading behaviour across 
geographical trading zones, and over the pre-and-post periods of the financial crisis. 
These differences in trading styles could help to understand the over and under reaction 
of the Euro-Dollar to shocks and events originated in different trading areas. 
                                                          
1 The news approach was pioneered by Edwards (1982,1983) and Hoffman and Schlagenhauf (1985). The 
central tenet is that the exchange rate is moved more by the surprise than by the point value of 
macroeconomic indicators referred to as fundamentals. 
2
 We refer the interested reader to Neely and Dey (2010) who provide an excellent review of all 
contributions in this field. 
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Our results are robust in as much as they confirm some general well-established effects 
discussed in previous studies, such as the dominance of “real economy” news over 
interest and inflation surprises (Hayo and Neuenkirch, 2012), and of American 
announcements over European news (Ehrman and Fratzscher, 2005) 3, as well as the 
presence of asymmetric reactions to good and bad news. However, our results are 
innovative and provide original contributions in revealing how and to what extent the 
financial crisis has affected the attitudes of traders operating in different trading zones 
when reacting to announcements and events originated in various trading zones and 
times4. Thus, we find that both the conditional mean and the conditional volatility of the 
Euro-Dollar display asymmetric reactions to bad and good news5 and that the financial 
crisis influenced these asymmetries, by making traders more reactive to those events 
weakening the Dollar than to those shocks strengthening it, and more sensitive to the 
order of magnitude of these shocks. In addition to these findings, our results suggest that 
after 2008, some types of fundamentals and news become irrelevant while others gain a 
significant role. This is particularly true for the German interest rate, which gains a pivotal 
role after the crisis. Lastly we find evidence of over-reaction or under-reaction to some 
news, meaning these news can affect traders beyond the time of their announcements, and 
that the patterns of these delayed responses6 have been affected by the crisis. We argue 
                                                          
3
 Ehrman and Fratzcher (2005) claim that the dominance of US macroeconomics news over the European 
news can be attributed to the earlier release time of the US news relative to the corresponding German and 
Euro-area news. However, thanks to our partition of the trading day, we found that although many Euro-
area news are actually released before American news, still American news (scheduled and unscheduled) 
play the major role.  
4
 Also Guiso et al. (2013) and Hoffmann et al. (2013) found that the financial crisis affected risk perception 
and risk taking of traders in financial markets. 
5
 Similarly to Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) we find that the exchange rate responds in mean more 
strongly to news in periods of increased market uncertainty and that this reaction depends on the state of 
the business cycle, on the type of news and on their content of good versus bad news (Fatum et al., 2012). 
However differently from the past studies, we are able to extend these results to the exchange rate volatility. 
6 These results differ markedly from Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995) and Andersen et al. (2003) who 
contend that the response of exchange rates to news is a very short-term phenomenon. 
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that the presence of cases of over- or under-reaction, does not necessarily imply a failure 
of the Market Efficiency Hypothesis and the presence of behavioural biases7. This is 
because, most likely these over and under-reactions do not come from the same traders, 
but from different traders operating in different geographical and temporal trading zones, 
who, based on their own perceptions and interpretation of news and on their different 
trading style, react when the opportunity (and time) of acting comes. Indeed most of the 
over- or under- reactions come from Asian trading time zone traders who correct or 
confirm responses of previous traders when the Asian market opens. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 the econometric methodology 
is introduced and explained, then in Section 3 the data are presented, while in Section 4 
the specification and estimations issues are discussed. In Section 5 the results and 
limitations are presented and commented. Finally Section 6 concludes and indicates 
directions for further research. 
 
2. Methodology and Econometric Model 
In our analysis we estimate a news equation of the Euro-Dollar exchange rate to assess 
the market reaction of investors following the release of different typologies of news 
(scheduled and unscheduled) at different times of the global trading day (GTD)8. Our 
                                                          
7
 Research in behavioural finance explains the presence of anomalies and price patterns that contrast with 
the standard EMH by investigating the relevance and the effects of investors’ psychology on asset pricing. 
The field of behavioural finance thus combines methods originated in psychology with the more traditional 
finance research methods. In doing so, it offers an alternative theoretical approach to the study of financial 
markets, taking impetus from the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). For an overall overview 
in the stock markets see, for example, Barberis and Thaler (2003) and Shiller (2005). In the foreign 
exchange markets, among others, Oberlechner and Hocking (2004), De Grauwe and Grimaldi, (2006) and 
Oberlechner and Osler (2012). 
8
 Table A.1 in Appendix (Supplementary Data) reports the main features of the global foreign exchange 
market turnover from 2001 to 2013 using data from various editions of the Bank of International 
Settlements Triennial Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity. According to 
the BIS’s evidence at the end of 2013 (2010) the Euro-US Dollar exchange rate accounts for 24% (28%) of 
the global foreign exchange market turnover. In the Appendix (Supplementary Data) we also show the 
geographical distribution of the global FX turnover and the contribution of different market participant 
categories to the global FX trading activity. 
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econometric model captures the feature that the global trading day never stops and it runs 
through three main intervals or eight-hour time zones: Asian Time Zone (ASTZ), 
European Time Zone (ETZ), and an American Time Zone, (ATZ). 
The eight-hour time series have been built in the following order: the trading day starts 
in Asia (ASTZ), to continue in Europe (ETZ), and then in America (ATZ). ASTZ goes 
from the closing of Wall Street at 4PM EST in the previous day (10PM in Central 
European Time, CET) to 6AM, CET. ETZ goes from 6AM to 2PM, CET, before the ECB 
Euro “fixing” and the publication of important macro news in the US (8:30AM EST, 
corresponding to 2:30PM, CET). The ATZ goes from 2PM, CET, to 10PM CET (4PM 
EST) of the current day. We thus see that our GTD does not correspond to the 
astronomical 24-hour day as it begins two hours before midnight CET, on the previous 
day, and ends two hours before midnight CET, on the current day. The three values of the 
exchange rates are then placed at 6AM, 2PM and 10PM, CET.  
All the explanatory variables in our empirical relationships are recorded and coded 
according to a thrice-daily frequency and are placed within the three time zones. 
Therefore they can explain the Euro-Dollar returns at the corresponding three hours 
defined above. The thrice-daily choice allows a finer attribution of policy events and news 
to a more homogeneous set of market participants (belonging to the same trading zones) 
and to differentiate across heterogeneous traders (belonging to different trading areas), 
without being disturbed by noisy data (in the ultra-high frequency). 
 
[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
In order to shed some extra light on how news, expectations and market sentiment 
determines the wild swings of Euro-Dollar, this study uses – together with the traditional 
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scheduled macro news - a relatively novel kind of news variables, called unscheduled 
news9, consisting of political news, policy statements, market news, interventions by 
Central Banks, unexpected monetary policy decisions and other events, all occurring 
somewhat randomly overtime or, even though expected to occur at a known time, having 
an unknown content or an ex-ante unpredictable impact on exchange rates, because of 
time-inconsistent decoding by heterogeneous traders.10 
The general specification of our model is as follows: 
    ∆��    =  � + (�ଵ�ଵ + �ଶ �ଶ  + �ଷ �ଷ  )∆�� + (�૙′ �଴ + �૚′  �ଵ + �૛′ �ଶ  + �૜′  �ଷ  )ࢅ� 
+ (ࢼ૙′ �଴ + ࢼ૚′  �ଵ + ࢼ૛′ �ଶ  + ࢼ૜′  �ଷ  )[ࢆ� – �(ࢆ)�]
+ (ࢽ૙′ �଴ + ࢽ૚′  �ଵ +  ࢽ૛′ �ଶ  + ࢽ૜′  �ଷ  )�� + ��                                                         (1) 
Where ∆St = log(St /St -1 ) is the thrice-daily return between two consecutive time zone (t 
and t-1) sampled at the end of each relevant time zone. The symbols μ, �′, ȕ’, and Ȗ’ are 
parameters or vectors of parameters to be estimated and �Rt is a stochastic error expected 
to be normally distributed with zero mean and constant unconditional variance. 
The letter L is the lag operator, and its exponential index indicates the number of times 
that the associated variable has been lagged. A three lags structure would cover the length 
of one global trading day.11 Lagged values of fundamentals and news variables should 
capture the reactions of traders operating in a specific trading area to past events and news 
originated in preceding trading areas meaning that an event can still exert some effect in 
a time zone different from the one when it occurred. 
The letter Y indicates a vector of fundamentals, the letter Z is used to indicate the vector 
of macroeconomic indicators and E(Z) is the vector of their respective expected values, 
                                                          
9
 This definition is proposed by Ederington and Lee (1996), Fornari and Mele (2001) and Tivegna and 
Chiofi (2004). 
10
 The same line of analysis is used by Fair (2002, 2003), Fatum and Hutchinson (2002), whose approach 
is probably the closest to the one in this paper. The most recent papers in this approach are by Fratzscher 
(2008a, b). 
11
 On estimation we also tried a fourth lag which represents the same time zone one day earlier. Lags longer 
than 3 periods were never statistically significant. 
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so that their difference, in brackets, is the news or surprise that would move the exchange 
rate. The letter U is used to indicate the unscheduled news, mentioned earlier on and 
explained more in detail in the next session of the paper. 
We also consider asymmetries12 in the Euro/Dollar exchange rate volatility produced by 
large swings of Euro-Dollar and unaccounted for in the mean part of the model using an 
exponential GARCH (EGARCH) specification (Nelson,1991). The conditional variance 
of error terms assuming a Gaussian distribution for the innovation (Hamilton, 1994) is 
modeled as: 
log(ℎ�) = � + ��௝  ௠௝=ଵ  � ���−௝� − �2� � +  ��௝௠௝=ଵ ��−௝ + �ߜ௟log (ℎ�−௟௞௟=ଵ )                                  (2) 
Where:  �� = ��/�ℎ� ~�(0,1) 
The parameter φ
 
is the asymmetry parameter. When φj =0, then a positive unaccounted 
surprise has the same effect on volatility as a negative surprise of the same magnitude; if 
-1 < φj < 0 a positive unaccounted surprise increases volatility less than an negative 
surprise (negative leverage). The parameter θ indicates the sensitivity of volatility to large 
unaccounted news. A positive value implies that the large surprises of both sign will 
increase the volatility. 
 
3. Data  
The construction of thrice-daily time series of exchange rates and of other fundamental 
financial variables (stock indexes and interest rates) was carried out paying attention to 
the alignment and correct attribution of each observation to its correct time zones13, 
                                                          
12
 Andersen et al. (2003) show evidence of asymmetries in the UDS foreign exchange market returns versus 
Euro, DM, UKP and JPY while Fatum et al. (2012) document asymmetric (different) market reactions on 
the JPY/USD exchange rate for negative and positive surprise. 
13
 Scheduled news fell very well in our time zones and great care was employed to do the same for 
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keeping also track of changes in Daylight-saving time between the ETZ and the ATZ. 
The same was true for the rest of the scheduled news and unscheduled news, attributing 
the news to the time zone interval (ASTZ, ETZ, ATZ) during which the news was 
released. 
 
3.1 Dependent Variable and Fundamentals 
Thrice-daily data on exchange rates, for the set-up shown in Fig. 1, were extracted from 
an hourly time series of Euro/US Dollar obtained from CQG Data and maintained with 
data controls overtime. The St time series begins in ASTZ on January 1, 2003 and ends 
in ATZ, 6849 8-hour periods later, on August 31, 2011. 
Traditional exchange rates empirics take into consideration also interest rates differentials 
and stock indexes. The same was done for the high frequency employed in this paper. 
Relevant data for Dow Jones, DAX, Nikkei 225, FTSE All Shares, 10-Year Government 
bond yield for US, UK, Germany and Japan, were obtained from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. 
Daily returns for stock market indexes assuming reinvestment of dividends are computed 
as 24 hours (logarithmic) change of the cum-dividends values of the indices for national 
stock market. 
                                                          
unscheduled news, as mentioned in the previous paragraph. Daylight-saving time (DST) differences on the 
two sides of the Atlantic required some attention. Corrections were needed when the time difference 
between the countries in the Eurozone plus UK and the United States (East Coast) moved away from the 
normal 6 span, going to 7 or 5 hours, according to permanence in DST in one geographical block but not 
in the other and vice-versa. That was all the most important because a large bunch of US scheduled news, 
those released at 2:30PM (CET, in regular times), move from ATZ to ETZ, when the US is in DST but 
Europe is not. Other scheduled news were also affected. From 2003 to 2006, the problem had limited 
dimensions (but corrections had to be made, anyway), from 2007 it was absolutely necessary to cope with 
this issue. In fact, between 2003 and 2006 Europe moved into DST in the last weekend of March and USA 
used to follow suit one week later in April. Between the same years above, Europe and USA used to go 
back in October to solar time on the same day (last Sunday of October). Starting from 2007, however, the 
US started moving into DST three weeks earlier, in March, and hence before the European change into 
DST, occurring during the last week of March. Changes occurred also in October, when the US goes back 
into solar time a week later than Europe. 
8 
  
 
3.2 Scheduled news 
The next set of explanatory variables in equation (1), is about scheduled news. These 
variables are “unexpected” values of main macroeconomic announcements made by 
Government statistical Agencies and Departments, Central Banks, Institutes or Centers 
of Economic Research, National or Supranational Institutions. Amongst the global area 
of the Euro-Dollar exchange rate, during our sample period, 2003–2011, United States, 
Euro-Area as a whole, Germany and United Kingdom have had a calendar of statistical 
releases of economic indicators made known well ahead (in fact at scheduled times), 
typically in the early hours of their respective trading zones, with a few exceptions, 
though. 
The scheduled macroeconomic “surprises” are computed by taking the difference 
between the actual value of the macroeconomic release, announced by the statistical 
authorities, and its expected value, collected by specialized organizations. The set of 
macroeconomic announcements and market consensus we used is from Bloomberg News 
Service.14 Because these surprises have different units of account, we followed the 
convention to standardize them, as well as the dependent variable, using the standard 
deviations of the entire sample period according to the Balduzzi et al.’s (2001) 
procedure15.  For each scheduled and unscheduled news we identified and separated the 
                                                          
14
 Bloomberg provides results of a market survey conducted usually 48-72 hours prior to the release of 
important economic indicators. The survey polls economists across the industry for their estimate of a 
particular statistic. These estimates are then averaged to provide the Bloomberg Survey mean and median 
estimates. 
15
 Standardized variables did not have their mean removed, which explains the presence of the constant 
terms in our regressions. The use of the entire period standard deviation is justified by the fact that while 
we test whether the crisis has changed the conditional volatility of the exchange rate, we retain the 
underlying assumption of EGARCH model that the unconditional variance is constant along time. 
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positive surprises and used them as auxiliary interaction term to test for the presence of 
asymmetric reactions.    
Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of the scheduled announcements we 
considered for our study. The total number of macroeconomic indicators is 68 (25 for the 
United States, 17 for the Euro-Area, 14 for the United Kingdom16 and 12 for Germany). 
For each country or area we first classify the announcements according to frequency of 
release (monthly, quarterly or weekly) and provide the unit of measure of the indicator. 
Echoing Andersen et al. (2003) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) each announcement 
is then ordered within its frequency group according to its temporal sequence in the 
calendar month of release.17 
 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
3.3 Unscheduled news 
The unscheduled news typology is less frequently used in the econometric estimation of 
exchange rates empirical models.18 This is due to their nature: interpretation is necessary 
as their definition and perception by traders is quite idiosyncratic and time-varying. The 
decoding process by traders goes through non-homogeneous economic, financial, and 
policy evaluation models, including the way policy decisions are taken and implemented. 
                                                          
16
 We included several UK scheduled news to acknowledge the role of the UK as the European dominant 
trading and financial centre and to recognize that some UK scheduled news have a large impact on the 
value of the UK Pound with occasional spill-over effects on the Euro-Dollar rate. The only relevant UK 
scheduled type of news, with overtime-consistency, are the Bank of England’s “surprises”.  
17
 For most US indicators data are generally released in the subsequent month. Forward-looking indicators 
(Consumer Confidence Index, Philadelphia Manufacturing Index) refer to the same month of release. US 
GDP data deserve special attention as there are three monthly readings of GDP releases: Advance (about 
30 days after the previous quarter ends), Preliminary (about 60 days after the previous quarter ends) and 
Final (about 90 days after the previous quarter ends). Since the Advance version is the earliest release of 
GDP one would expect, a priori, that the advanced data surprise should have the major impact in term of 
market reaction. The same temporal pattern is usually followed by the macro announcements for United 
Kingdom, Germany and the Euro-Area (more casually for these latter two entities). 
18
 For recent studies that used macroeconomic surprises and unscheduled news in stock and interest rates 
markets see, for example, Birz and Lott.(2011), Rosa (2011), Jiang et al. (2012) and Beetsma et al. (2013). 
For an earlier attempt on the forex market see Tivegna (2002).  
10 
  
That makes quite hard to propose an unambiguous taxonomy of unscheduled news. In 
principle, unscheduled news consists of an economic, an institutional or a policy event, a 
declaration or a disclosure, which can be either totally unexpected or - even though 
expected to occur - has an unknown timing, or an unknown content or both and frequently 
producing weird and ex-ante unpredictable reactions from financial markets. This news 
typology, therefore, implies a process of expectation formation very different from that 
of scheduled news and most likely to be variable overtime. A synthetic taxonomy of these 
events could be the following: 
A) Scheduled policy statements, like the press conferences of ECB Governors or the 
Humphrey-Hawkins testimonies by US Fed Chiefs. These statements have generally an 
uncertain content on internationally sensitive arguments, frequently different from market 
expectations. In most recent times, the reactions to these generally unequivocal messages 
have become excessive, abnormal and highly volatile. 
B) Unscheduled policy statements or simple opinions in interviews or in question and 
answer sessions at the end of formal press conferences (examples: the ECB and, in recent 
times, the Fed ones). Exchange rates response to these events suffers from the same 
problems as A above.  
C) Terrorist events deemed to be influential on policy decisions, on commodity price 
developments (especially oil) or on international mobility of factors of production19. 
D) Institutional or personality events (Government or Parliamentarian) involving leading 
policy makers, potentially able to cause policy changes. 
E) Public interventions by Central Banks in the foreign exchange market or statements 
announcing or threatening them (Japanese Authorities is a good example). 
                                                          
19 Old terrorism news were totally unexpected and it was not clear what their long-term impact would be. 
On the other hand, political news –in general, not monetary policy news- are not totally unexpected and 
operators have some ideas about their impact on the economy. So we decided not to include them.  
11 
  
F) Low-ranking policy makers’ comments to unexpected – or moderately so – monetary 
policy decisions and other authoritative comments on economic indicators in relation to 
macroeconomic or market trends; 
G) Unexpected – or moderately so - upgrading or downgrading of creditworthiness (of 
entire countries, or of important financial Institutions, or of various asset typologies) or 
changes of previous forecasts by Rating Agencies or by domestic or international policy 
Institutions. Examples of some unscheduled news are reported in Table 2 and a more 
exhaustive description of unscheduled news is in Cagliesi et al., (2014).20 After the ex-
ante selection of typology of unscheduled, news were collected and coded as qualitative 
variables attributing them the value of (+1) or (-1) according to the following convention: 
unscheduled news were given a value of (+1) if their a priori effect was likely to 
strengthen the Euro-Dollar exchange rate -either because they had a content directly 
favourable to the Euro or because they had a content directly unfavourable to the Dollar. 
Alternatively, the surprises were coded with a value of (-1) if it was more likely that they 
would produce a weakening of the Euro-Dollar rate. This coding convention allowed us 
to test for asymmetric effects by separating the unscheduled news according to their sign 
and using an interaction term for the strengthening news.  
For each time zone ASTZ, ETZ, ATZ, the A-G categories of unscheduled news have been 
aggregated into a single vector. This decision of aggregating different typologies was 
taken for two reasons: to reduce the number of explanatory variables and because some 
unscheduled news categories have somehow evolved21. Given their qualitative nature and 
                                                          
20
 Table 2 contains for each unscheduled news the date and the weekday of release, the text of the event, 
the time-zone of reference, the expected sign on the Euro-Dollar rate, the news typology, referred to the A-
G itemization above and the source of the news     
21 Aggregating all news into a single vector destroys some information.  Public intervention by ECB in the 
forex market occurred only twice in the initial period, which is outside our sample. Statements by policy 
makers have become fewer over the years and much less lambasting than in the early years.  This lack of 
12 
  
trinary/binary representation, unscheduled surprises have not been standardized. We 
stress again that every single unscheduled news was attributed to its own time zone22, 
often using Bloomberg time stamps, and that, to avoid “double counting” effects and 
correlation issues between scheduled and unscheduled news, a consistent criterion of 
“non-overlapping” recording was used. According to this criterion – violated only in 
exceptional circumstances23- whenever a scheduled news was released in a specific time 
zone, any related or unrelated unscheduled news falling in the same time interval would 
not be recorded. Moreover, whenever several unscheduled news had occurred within the 
same time zone interval, only one would be recorded. 24  
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
4. Estimates 
Before estimating our model we tested all news for normality and white noise25 and for 
                                                          
homogeneity amongst the unscheduled news and the risk to obtain biased and unstable coefficients due to 
paucity of observations of specific unscheduled news has suggested to aggregate everything. 
22
 The assignment of this single aggregate unscheduled news group to the three time and trading zones (e.g 
ASTZ, ETZ, ATZ) was carried out not on a nationality or area-pertinence basis but by the timing of the 
news. 
23
 When, for instance, an unscheduled surprise had an opposite a priory sign effect of a scheduled surprise 
released in the same time zone interval. 
24
 Those unscheduled news that conformed to the A-G typology and to the above recording criteria were 
extracted from a large archive of daily events dating from 1998 (and before, see Tivegna and Chiofi, 2004) 
until today. This unique hand-collected archive of news – called informally Newsmetrics – contains, each 
day, on average between ten and fifteen daily articles and extended newsflashes from the Financial Times, 
the Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg News, Reuters and Dow Jones Newswires. Within this group, there 
have always been the daily articles on the foreign exchange market and on the US stock market. So, for 
instance, in recent times, the communication of ECB council decisions on interest rates to financial markets 
(at or a little before 1PM, CET, well within ETZ) does not move Euro-Dollar that much. The ECB press 
conference, generally at 2:30PM CET, is in ATZ and assigned to this area, even though it is the most 
European event for financial markets, after the beginning of the Euro era in 1999. And the real reaction 
occurs there. The reliance mostly on newspaper articles deserves some extra speculation. In fact, the same 
idea of a tri-partition of the GTD is to a large extent due to the news search process employed in this and 
previous studies, Fornari et al. (2002), Tivegna and Chiofi (2004) and Cagliesi and Tivegna (2006). 
25
 We tested for white noise so to avoid to attribute the presence of delayed reaction to news to a possible 
autoregressive structure of their statistical process. To be a surprise, a news ought to be not predictable-
hence a white noise.  Table A.2 in Appendix (Supplementary Data) reports the main statistical features of 
the entire sample of news and the results of Jarque-Bera and Ljung-Box tests. In tables A.3 to A.10 of the 
Appendix (Supplementary Data) we show the results of the analyses for correlation between news and 
cross-correlation with lagged news. 
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current and cross-correlations, so to avoid - as much as possible – issues of collinearity 
and distortions. After this first statistical screening process, the initial phase of 
econometric procedure was carried out using a standard OLS estimates for the entire 
sample period -running from January 1th, 2003 and August 31st, 2011 - as a first 
exploration of the general specification of the news model and of the stability of 
coefficients. OLS estimates indicates that the relevant scheduled news were only a small 
subset of the originals ones (68) while all unscheduled were highly statistically relevant. 
We used the OLS specification reported in Table 3 to investigate the presence of a 
structural break around the financial crisis period. The table reports the value of the 
Hansen test and of the Chow test, while Figure 2 shows the analysis of recursive residuals. 
The Hansen test is a test for general parameter stability based on the behaviours of the 
partial sums of the regression’s normal equations for the parameters and for the variance. 
We produce statistics and approximate p-values for the overall regression (coefficients 
and variance) as well as for each coefficient and for the variance individually. The Hansen 
test indicated the presence of a structural break in the parameter and in the variance. The 
Chow test, and historical hindsight, helped to position the structural break at the end of 
February 2008. Although the collapse of Lehman Brother on September 15, 2008 might 
have appeared to be a natural choice, the subprime crisis in the US had been mounting up 
from early 2007, with the accelerated deflation of house prices and the market started 
showing level of anxieties already at the beginning for 2008, as showed by the graphs of 
the recursive residuals. 
 
 [PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3, FIGURE 2 and FIGURE 3 HERE] 
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The indication in the Hansen test and the use of financial time series sampled in high 
frequency prompted us to take into account the possible issue of heteroschedasticity and 
to consider an ARCH-type of models. Given our research interests, we chose the 
exponential GARCH (EGARCH) models which enable to test for asymmetric response 
of the conditional volatility of the exchange rate to positive and negative values of the 
innovation term �Rt of the exchange rate equation, and to the order of magnitude of the 
innovation term itself. We quantify these effects in the analysis of the volatility curve 
which is presented in the final part of section 5. In addition to asymmetric reactions in 
volatility we also test, with the help of auxiliary variables, the presence of asymmetric 
reactions of the exchange rate to positive and negative scheduled and unscheduled news 
included in the linear part of the EGARCH. To distinguish between the “accounted for” 
news (schedules and unscheduled news) included in the conditional mean equation of the 
exchange rate and the “unaccounted for” news (innovation term) included in the 
conditional volatility equation, we shall refer to the latter ones as to “unaccounted 
surprises”. 
EGARCH estimations are carried out in using the Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno 
(BFGS) optimization method.  Many empirical studies use basic GARCH(1,1) to model 
daily conditional volatility.26 Based on this practice, and because our daily volatility is 
composed by three time intervals, we propose to use EGARCH with up to 3 lags.27 In 
discussing our results in the coming section we will generally make reference to the 
                                                          
26
 See for example Andersen et al. (2000) who point out the use of daily GARCH (1,1) as benchmark model 
in exchange rates volatility determination. 
27 For both sub-periods –prior and post financial crisis- we also tried lower order EGARCH but they did 
either not converge (EGARCH 1,1) or converge too soon (iterations number lower than number of 
estimated parameters indicates inaccurate values of estimates) so we accepted our initial choice of an 
EGARCH (3,1) structure. 
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EGARCH(3,1) sub-period1 and sub-period2 to indicate the models we estimated prior 
and after the financial crisis. 
 
5. Estimations Results 
The econometric results of EGARCH equations are reported in Table 4.28 In what follows, 
we will discuss the impact of the financial crisis on the Euro-Dollar rate through the 
channels of fundamentals, unscheduled and scheduled news and through the volatility 
curve. 
 [PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
5.1 Results: Lagged exchange rate and fundamentals 
The three main findings identified are the quicker “mean reversion process”, the changed 
importance of long-term interest rates and the peculiar role of the Dow Jones. We start 
with the first result. Our estimates in Table 4 show that the Euro-Dollar rate exhibits a 
mean reverting behaviour. If we sum the values of these three lagged coefficients of the 
Euro-Dollar, we could conclude that the overall daily adjustment of the rate does not seem 
to have been affected by the crisis, meaning that over a period of one day the exchange 
rate was still expected to revert back by about a fifth of its percentage change. However, 
the comparison of individual lags shows that actually the crisis has produced some effects 
because, the adjustment of the rate, as shown in Table 4, becomes much quicker after the 
crisis, taking place almost entirely within the first temporal lag, that is, within the first 
                                                          
28
 Table A.10 in the Appendix (Supplementary Data) reports the results of the OLS regressions for the two 
sub-periods. 
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following 8 hours of trading instead of within two lags, as if the crisis, had induced day-
traders to close their long positions quicker. 29 
The other interesting finding is the changed role of long-term interest rates. The estimated 
coefficients show that ten-year interest rates have the expected signs and expected ranking 
in both sub-periods: an increase in the long-term German rate (the main Eurozone 
financial market) strengthens the Euro whereas an increase in long-term US rates 
produces the opposite effects.30 The effect of the crisis on the role of these variables would 
manifest mainly via the increased importance of the German rate, whose overall 
coefficient almost doubled in magnitude (from 0.16 to 0.33) and via the decreased impact 
effect of the US rate (from -0.31 to -0.19) even if its daily overall effect remained the 
same. In other words, the crisis has reduced the impact effect of the US rate while it has 
increased the overall effect of the German rate.  
Another interesting result of Table 4 is the dramatic change in the post crisis period of the 
relation between the Dow Jones (DJ)31 and the Euro-Dollar rate, which is something in 
line with what traders around the world have come to realize. Our estimates indicate that 
prior to the financial crisis an increase in the DJ would mildly strengthen the Dollar (-
0.05) by attracting financial flows into the US, the leading stock market in the world. 
However, in the second sub-period the effect of the DJ is much stronger and, most 
importantly, it is reverted in sign (0.30). This striking change in the DJ and the Dollar 
                                                          
29 Table A.1 (Part C and Part D) in the Appendix highlights that, after 2007,  the ”Other financial 
institutions” category becomes the main driver of the global foreign exchange market turnover. It is quite 
possible that market partecipants belonging to this category (smaller banks becoming clients of the main 
dealers, institutional investors, hedge funds, high-frequency traders, retail investors) generated the quicker 
reaction to the exchange rate.We thank an anonymous referee for this point. 
30
 The Japanese interest rates do not belong directly to movements of our currency pair. They enter mostly 
with a negative sign in sympathy – and because of the much wider business – with the US rates. The effect 
of Japanese interest rates on the Dollar-yen exchange rate is probably much bigger than that on the Euro-
Dollar rate. That is consistent with our results. 
31
 The European indexes such as the German DAX and British FTSE do not appear here because they turned 
out to be non-statistically significant or because of their high correlation with the DJ. 
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relation seems to suggest that, at times of unprecedented low US yields and high 
uncertainty, hedged trading in the stock market and currency market might have been 
seen as a good opportunity. 
  
5.2 Results: Unscheduled news 
To facilitate the reading of the results reported in Table 4, we created Table 5 to compare 
more clearly the pre and post-crisis types of reactions to unscheduled news. 
 According to our estimates the crisis has not affected traders’ “time-zone/home bias”, 
and in both sub period they show higher sensitivity to their own news (news released in 
their own trading zone) than to news released in other time zones. Similarly, the crisis 
does not seem to have affected the ranking of unscheduled news, and the dominant role 
of news released during the American time zone (ATZ) period, which, presumably, are 
mainly Dollar-related.  
However, the crisis has affected traders’ behaviour in two ways: it has removed traders’ 
under-reaction32 and it has made traders become more sensitive to unscheduled news that 
weakened the dollar (e.g., to bad news for the dollar) than to unscheduled news that 
strengthened it33.  The over/under reaction is a delayed reaction to a surprise and hence, 
it is tested by using lagged news (be them unscheduled or scheduled news).  The delayed 
reaction could either confirm or counteract the original reaction, causing the exchange 
                                                          
32
 An over-reaction (under-reaction) occurs when traders operating later during the day counteract 
(reinforce) the original reactions of previous traders (e.g., traders who had operated in a different time 
zone), inducing a reverting (drifting) behaviour of the exchange rate.  
33
 As explained earlier in the text, the presence of asymmetric reactions to good and bad unscheduled news 
is tested by adding to the overall vector of the positive and negative news, another vector (interaction term) 
that contains only Euro-positive news. An asymmetric reaction is at work whenever the coefficient of the 
interaction term is statistically significant. The estimated coefficient of the overall vector of the unscheduled 
news, which includes both positive as well as negative news, gives directly the effect of negative 
unscheduled news (negative for the Euro). To find the effect of positive news, one ought to sum the 
coefficient of the interaction term (positive news) to the coefficient of the overall vector of unscheduled 
news (positive and negative). Asymmetric effects can also be computed for delayed reactions whenever the 
lag of the interaction term occurs to be statistically significant. 
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rate either to trend (under-reaction case) or to revert back (over-reaction case). Our results 
show that the under-reaction to ATZ unscheduled news that occurred before the crisis 
disappears in the post-crisis period, meaning that ATZ zone’s traders have reacted more 
fully and decisively to the ATZ news especially to the dollar weakening ones, rendering 
the corrective action of subsequent traders unnecessary. For traders operating in the ETZ 
zone the effect of the crisis is even more dramatic changing their pre-crisis under-
reactions into post crisis over-reactions.    
The other effect of the crisis is the arising of asymmetric reactions to Euro or to Dollar 
positive/negative events. Prior to the 2008 crisis the exchange rate does not show any 
asymmetric reactions to either ETZ or ATZ unscheduled news. The picture changes after 
the 2008 and ATZ traders show an increased sensitivity to ATZ dollar weakening 
unscheduled (ATZ) than to ATZ dollar strengthening unscheduled (the coefficient for the 
dollar-bad news is 1.61 compared to the dollar-good news of 1.25). We find that this 
increased sensitivity and the quicker response to unfavourable Dollar-content events 
extend from the conditional mean to the conditional volatility, as explained in the section 
of the analysis of the volatility curve. 
 
 [PLEASE INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
5.3 Results: Scheduled news 
Similarly to what we did for the unscheduled news, we tested for asymmetric reactions 
to scheduled news and, when we moved from GARCH models into EGARCH models, 
these asymmetric reactions to bad and good scheduled news disappeared from the 
conditional mean to reappear in terms of conditional volatility. This result does not come 
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as a surprise given that the EGARCH model enables to account specifically for eventual 
asymmetric reactions to positive and negative surprises in the volatility (e.g., the leverage 
effect) of exchange rate returns. We will discuss this point further in the section devoted 
to the volatility analysis. 
The two most interesting findings produced by the crisis are in relation to the ranking of 
some macroeconomic news, and to traders’ under/over-reactions34. In relation to the 
ranking, one can observe that while some macroeconomics indicators have been 
consistently relevant along time (such as for instance German IFO Business Climate 
Indicator, the Bank of England rate, the Nonfarm Payroll, and the Producer Price Index, 
net of food and energy, corrected to take into account of the differences in daylight saving 
time weeks between Europe and the US), some others have lost their influence after the 
2008 (such as the GDP in the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the American 
Manufacturing Index (ISM)), and some others have become relevant only after the crisis 
(such as the Consumer Price Index Flash in Europe (EMU) and US GDP).  
In the ATZ zone, as the ISM indicator lost its effect, the Nonfarm Payroll doubled in 
magnitude becoming the most powerful scheduled news after the crisis (from -0.58 before 
the crisis to -1.04 after the crisis). The doubling of its coefficient indicates a greater 
attention paid to the US labour market surprises in moving from a sub-period of buoyant 
growth to a sub-period where uncertainty over the US business cycle loomed larger.35   
                                                          
34
 We thank an anonymous referee who suggested to add time-zone dummies to our EGARCH equations 
to check for possible differences in the mean of the exchange rate across the three trading zones. These 
dummies produced some effects only in the pre-crisis period by altering the value of the constant term but 
not the value of any other coefficient of the regression. The crisis seems to have removed any time-zone 
difference in mean creating an “ambient uniformity” across the three zones.  
 
35 The Nonfarm Payroll indicator is released at the opening of the ATZ trading time when the ETZ and 
ATZ overlap for a few hours, and the combined action of European and American traders is at its peak. 
This contributes to explain partly the magnitude of its coefficient which captures the actions of European 
and American traders. 
20 
  
The comparison of current and lagged coefficients in both sub-period would confirm that 
the crisis has either eliminated traders’ under-reactions or transformed them into over-
reactions, particularly in the ATZ and ETZ trading zones. Interestingly, the EMU CPI 
does not elicit any reaction in the European time zone (the liquidity trap, and cost push 
inflation via commodity prices have weakened the link between higher inflation and 
stronger Euro) but it prompts a delayed reaction in the American trading zone. In other 
words, higher than expected CPI inflation is perceived by US traders as “more troubles” 
for the Euro, given the limited margin of manoeuvring left to the European Central bank 
in front of the urgency to help the recovery and avoid the Euro collapse. 
  
5.4 Analysis of the volatility curves  
The estimated coefficients of the EGARCH volatility equations are: 
log(ℎ�) = −0.11 + 0.14�|��−ଵ| − �(2/�  )  � +  0.02 (��−ଵ) − 0.19 log(ℎ�−ଵ) +                        
                     +0.27 log(ℎ�−ଶ) + 0.91 log(ℎ�−ଷ)                                                                                        (3.1) 
 
log(ℎ�) = −0.18 + 0.24�|��−ଵ| − �(2/�  )  � +  0.03 (��−ଵ) − 0.45 log(ℎ�−ଵ) + 
                   +0.73 log(ℎ�−ଶ) + 0.71 log(ℎ�−ଷ)                                                                                          (3.2) 
In these equations the conditional variance is a function of its past values and of an 
innovation term (e.g., a standard normal variable that captures “unaccounted” surprises). 
These equations show the following features of conditional volatility. Firstly, the 
conditional variance of each trading interval is affected by its past values up to a 24 hours 
delay (the t-statistics of the coefficients of the three lags of the volatility are all statistically 
relevant).  
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Secondly the volatility transmission is high and, in the absence of any new “unaccounted“ 
surprise, the volatility would eventually die out, although slowly. This point can be shown 
by summing up the coefficients of the lags of the conditional variance.  
Thirdly in the pre-crisis equation (3.1), the asymmetric coefficient is (0.02) and 
statistically significant only at 10%. However, in the post–crisis equation (3.2) the same 
coefficient becomes substantially bigger (0.03) and statistically relevant. 
Fourthly for both equations the asymmetric coefficient is positive, meaning that a positive 
unaccounted surprise (for instance large positive movements, due, for instance, to trading 
positioning that causes sharp swings in Euro-Dollar) increases the conditional volatility 
of the Euro-Dollar rate more than a negative unaccounted surprise of the same order of 
magnitude would. A positive “unaccounted” news in the Euro-Dollar rate equation is 
Euro-positive but it is at the same time Dollar-negative, because of our definition of this 
currency pair. Therefore, an asymmetric reaction of the volatility to positive innovations 
implies that the market becomes more “nervous” when hit by “unaccounted” surprises 
that weaken the Dollar than when hit by unaccounted surprise of the same magnitude that 
weaken the Euro. The bigger value of the asymmetric coefficient after the 2008 indicates 
that the occurrence of the financial crisis indeed increased the nervousness of the market 
to innovation weakening the Dollar.  
Another feature of the volatility (equations 3.1 and 3.2) is that it reacts to “big” surprises 
of both signs. The coefficient associated with the size of the standardized innovation (i.e. 
the coefficient that multiplies the standardized absolute innovation) is statistically 
relevant and positive in both sub-periods and it becomes substantially bigger after the 
financial crisis (0.14 in sub-period1 and 0.24 in sub-period 2). This finding suggests that 
the financial crisis amplified the reaction of volatility to “big” surprises. In other words, 
the swing in the exchange rate triggered by a big unexplained surprise has become much 
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more pronounced after the crisis than before due perhaps the increased uncertainty 
brought by the crisis and fears of losses. 
Taking into account the combined effects of sign and size of unaccounted surprises, we 
can conclude that unaccounted news that weaken the Dollar and strengthen the Euro tend 
to increase the conditional volatility in the immediate future much more than same size 
news that strengthen the Dollar and weaken the Euro, a result similar to the “leverage 
effect” in the stock market literature (Black,1976; Christie, 1982). 
To quantify the impact of positive and large “unaccounted” surprises on volatility, one 
ought to transform equations into a non-logarithmic form. This is because the 
quantification of the asymmetric and magnitude effects on volatility is made complicated 
by the fact that the EGARCH is a semi-log form with the regressand expressed in logs 
and the regressors expressed in both logarithmic and linear forms, and by the fact that the 
regressand is in variance term while part of the regressors are in volatility terms (standard 
deviations) terms. 
After the transformation, we compute the news impact curve coming from the EGARCH 
specification of each sub-period, and we compare the curves to assess the effects of the 
financial crisis on the conditional volatility of the Euro-Dollar rate. The volatility curves 
are obtained by computing the square root of the anti-log transformation of the 
conditional variance (equations 3.1 and 3.2) for different values of the standardized and 
absolute standardized innovations (z-variable).36 Table 6 reports the results. To 
understand the magnitude of the effects of unaccounted surprises on volatility we consider 
3 different sizes of the “volatility” surprises: the small/medium positive surprises that fall 
in the interval between zero to 1 and that can occur with a probability of 34%; the larger 
                                                          
36
 The probability of a positive standardized innovation falling between 0 and 1 is 34%, while the one 
associated with one falling between 0 and 1.65 is 45% and one falling between 0 and 2.33 is 49%. Negative 
innovations have same values of probabilities taken on the left side of the standardized curve. 
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positive surprises that range from 1 to 1.65 and that occur with a probability of 11%; and 
the big positive surprises that range between 1.26 and 2.33 and can occur with a 
probability of 4%. The same classification applies to negative unaccounted surprises.37 
For each of these possible intervals we consider only one value: the value of each 
interval’s upper bound. So we have 6 possible cases: 3 cases when (standardized) positive 
surprises take the value of 1, 1.65 and 2.33 and 3 cases when (standardized) negative 
surprises take the values of (-1), (-1.65) and (-2.33). 
We can now quantify the post financial crisis increase in the reaction of volatility to 
unaccounted surprises of any sign and size: for instance a large Euro positive/Dollar 
negative surprise (+2.33) would increase the conditional volatility of about 36.32% after 
the crisis compared to an increase of 19.32% prior to the crisis. The same result is 
obtained when looking at negative surprises: for instance a large negative surprise (-2.33) 
increases the volatility by 28% compared to an increase of 15% prior to the crisis. Similar 
results hold for positive and negative medium (+1.65 and -1.65) surprises and for positive 
and negative smaller surprises (+1 and -1). Thus, as expected, the crisis brought along a 
general and pronounced increase in Euro/Dollar volatility and when we compare sizes of 
surprises, we can see that with a probability of 4% (which is the probability of a surprise 
to fall between + 1.65 and +2.33) the volatility would increase between 24.53% and 
36.32% in the second sub-period but only between 13.32% and 19.32% in the first sub-
period. 
It is also possible to quantify the second interesting result of our EGARCH estimates, 
namely the post financial crisis increase in the asymmetric reaction of the conditional 
                                                          
37
 Small/medium negative surprises range between (-1) and zero with a probability of 34%. The larger 
negative range from (-1.65) to (-1) with a probability of 11%. The big negative surprises range between  (-
2.33) and (-1.65) with a probability of 4%. 
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volatility to positive and negative surprise. From Table 6, we can see that, for instance, 
after the crisis the percentage impact on volatility of a large Euro positive (+2.33) and of 
a large Euro negative (-2.33) surprises are about 36.32% for positive and about 28.06% 
for negative surprise. However, the picture changes when we consider the period before 
the crisis when the volatility reaction to the same size of surprises would have been 
smaller and less asymmetric (with a percentage impact of 19% for large Euro positive 
surprises and of 15% for large Euro negative surprises). Thus the financial crisis brought 
not only an increase in volatility to any size and sign of surprises but also an increase in 
the “spread” of the asymmetric reactions to positive and negative surprises of any order 
of magnitude. 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
This study aimed to investigate the determinants of the Euro-Dollar exchange rate 
behaviour and to assess if the financial crisis had contributed to alter its dynamics. Our 
approach differs from previous contributions in several ways: firstly we employ a thrice-
daily frequency that reflects a “natural” partition of the trading day into three geographical 
trading areas, namely Asian, European and American trading time intervals; secondly we 
use both quantitative and qualitative news and events to ascertain the market reactions to 
different surprises that hit the market during the 24 hour trading day; thirdly we test for 
the presence of asymmetric effects to positive and negative surprises and for the presence 
of over-reaction and under-reaction to past news; lastly, we put trading behaviour into an 
historical perspective to study if and to what extent traders’ behaviour may have been 
affected by the international financial crisis initiated in 2007-2008. We believe that this 
enriched approach can provide some useful insights to better understand differences 
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across trading areas and structural changes triggered by the 2007-2008 events. We found 
that indeed the financial crisis affected the Euro-Dollar dynamics and its conditional 
volatility. After the crisis the Euro-Dollar displays a quicker and stronger mean reverting 
process as if traders were more inclined to keep their position for shorter periods. We also 
observe an increased propensity to display asymmetric reactions, in the mean (via 
unscheduled news) and in the conditional volatility of the EGARCH to surprises and 
events weakening dollar vis-à-vis the euro, as if traders were affected by a sort of 
behavioural negativity bias to unfavourable news related to the dollar. Moreover, the role 
played by some fundamentals after the crisis, noticeably the relevance and the sign of the 
DJ, seems to suggest that the crisis changed traders’ reactions toward uncertainty (Guiso 
et al.,2013; Hoffmann et al., 2013) and that possibly those traders who experienced higher 
realized or paper losses show a more pronounced loss aversion. Our results reveal that 
there is an increased importance of unscheduled events, particularly those ones generated 
in the American trading zone. There is also difference in the pattern of over-reaction and 
under-reaction to past event and a clear reduced importance of lagged scheduled and 
unscheduled news, with a parallel stronger effects of current news (showing a possible 
availability bias effect), particularly the news of pro-cyclical leading (IFO, Nonfarm 
Payroll) and coincident indicators (USA GDP) of the real economy. Although the use of 
the EGARCH (3,1) allowed us to account for asymmetries and lags of surprises, and 
interactions across areas, we recognize that one potential limitation of our study is that 
our model lacks to consider interactions across currencies. A multivariate EGARCH 
model specification that includes other currencies (UK Pound and Japanese Yen), and 
scheduled/unscheduled news related to alternative pairs could further improve our 
comprehension on how investors operating in different trading time zones react to a 
broader set of information. This development can be pursued in a future study. Another 
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promising avenue of our research is to use the estimated EGARCH for day-trading 
decisions by using the insights gained in looking at possible trading strategies across time 
zones in responding to news of the three zones, and by using the model to produce 
forecasts and give thrice-daily trading signals to go long or short on the Euro-Dollar. 
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Table 1 Summary of macroeconomic announcements 
 
       
Name of announcement Unit of 
announcement 
Release coverage 
 
Start date Final Date Source Number of 
obs. 
Announcement Time 
Euro-Area Announcements a  
(European Time Zone) 
Monthly        
Business Climate Indicator Index Data are for same month as the release month 07-Jan-2003 30-Aug-2011 DG ECFIN 95 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
ECB Rate  % level Data are for same month as the release month 09-Jan-2003 04-Aug-2011 ECB 105 13:45 am CET/07:45 am EST 
Economic Confidence  Index Data are for same month as the release month 31-Jan-2003 30-Aug-2011 DG ECFIN 101 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
Consumer Confidence  Index Data are for same month as the release month 31-Jan-2003 30-Aug-2011 DG ECFIN 100 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
Industrial Confidence Index Data are for same month as the release month 31-Jan-2003 30-Aug-2011 DG ECFIN 101 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
CPI Flash Y-Y% change Data are for the previous month 03-Jan-2003 31-Aug-2011 ESTAT 105 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
CPI Final Y-Y% change Data are for the previous month 22-Jan-2003 17-Aug-2011 ETSAT 105 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
CPI M-M% change Data are for the previous month 22-Jan-2003 17-Aug-2011 ESTAT 105 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
M3 M-M% change Data are for the previous month 28-Jan-2003 26-Aug-2011 ECB 102 10:00 am CET/04:00 am EST 
Unemployment rate % of labour force  Data are for two months prior  to release month  07-Jan-2003 01-Aug-2011 ESTAT 105 11:00 am CET/05:00 pm EST 
PPI  M-M% change Data are for two months prior  to release month  07-Jan-2003 02-Aug-2011 ESTAT 101 11:00 am CET/05:00 pm EST 
Retail Sales M-M% change Data are for two months prior  to release month  08-Jan-2003 03-Aug-2011 ESTAT 104 11:00 am CET/05:00 pm EST 
Retail Sales  Y-Y% change Data are for two months prior  to release month  08-Jan-2003 03-Aug-2011 ESTAT 105 11:00 am CET/05:00 pm EST 
Industrial Production M-M% change Data are for two months prior  to release month  17-Jan-2003 12-Aug-2011 ESTAT 105 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
Quarterly        
GDP Real Advance Q/Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 06-Mar-2003 16-Aug-2011 ESTAT 34 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
GDP Real Preliminary Q/Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 09-Jan-2003 08-Jun-2011 ESTAT 36 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
GDP Real Final Q/Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 06-Feb-2003 06-Apr-2011 ESTAT 34 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
Total      1543  
a)except for EBC rate and M3, before March 20004, all the indicators were released at 12:00 am CET/06:00 am EST 
Germany  Announcements 
 (European Time Zone) 
Monthly        
ZEW Survey Index Data are for same month as the release month 21-Jan-2003 23-Aug-2011 ZEW 104 11:00 am CET/05:00 am EST 
IFO Business Climate Index Data are for same month as the release month 28-Jan-2003 24-Aug-2011 IFO 104 10:00 am CET/04:00 am EST 
IFO Current Assessment Index Data are for same month as the release month 28-Jan-2003 24-Aug-2011 IFO 104 10:00 am CET/04:00 am EST 
IFO Expectation Index Data are for same month as the release month 28-Jan-2003 24-Aug-2011 IFO 104 10:00 am CET/04:00 am EST 
CPI Preliminary M-M% change Data are for same month as the release month 26-Feb-2003 29-Aug-2011 DSTATIS 103 varies 
Factory Orders M-M% change Data are for two months prior to release month  10-Jan-2003 04-Aug-2011 DB 103 12:00 am CET/06:00 am EST 
Industrial Production  M-M% change Data are for two months prior to release month  13-Jan-2003 05-Aug-2011 DSTATIS 105 12:00 am CET/06:00 am EST 
Retail Sales M-M% change Data are for the previous month 07-Jan-2003 31-Aug-2011 DSTATIS 103 08:00 am CET/02:00 am EST 
Unemployment Level b M-M change level Data are for the previous month 09-Jan-2003 31-Aug-2011 DSTATIS 105 08:55 am CET/02:55 am EST 
Unemployment Rate b M-M% change Data are for the previous month 09-Jan-2003 31-Aug-2011 DSTATIS 105 08:55 am CET/02:55 am EST 
PPI M-M% change Data are for the previous month 23-Jan-2003 19-Aug-2011 DSTATIS 104 08:00 am CET/02:00 am EST 
Quarterly        
GDP Real Preliminary Q-Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 26-Feb-2003 16-Aug-2011 DSTATIS 35 08:00 am CET/02:00 am EST 
Total      1179  
b)before July 2005, varies        
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United Kingdom Announcements  
(European Time Zone) 
Monthly        
BOE Rate % Level Data are for same month as the release month 09-Jan-2003 04-Aug-2011 BOE 103 13:00 am CET/07:00 pm EST 
GFK Consumer Confidence Index  Data are for same month as the release month 30-Jan-2003 31-Aug-2011 GFK NOP 104 11:30 am CET/05:30 pm EST 
PPI Output  Y-Y% change Data are for the previous month 13-Jan-2003 05-Aug-2011 ONS 104 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
Jobless Claim Change M-M change level Data are for the previous month 15-Jan-2003 17-Aug-2011 ONS 104 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
RPI Y-Y% change Data are for the previous month 21-Jan-2003 16-Aug-2011 ONS 104 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
RPI ex mort. Int. payment Y-Y% change Data are for the previous month 21-Jan-2003 16-Aug-2011 ONS 104 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
Retail Sales ex auto fuel Y-Y% change Data are for the previous month 23-Jan-2003 18-Aug-2011 ONS 104 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
Visible Trade  Y-Y% change Data are for two months prior to release month  10-Jan-2003 09-Aug-2011 ONS 103 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
Industrial Production Y-Y% change Data are for two months prior to release month  14-Jan-2003 09-Aug-2011 ONS 104 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
Manufactoring Production   Y-Y% change Data are for two months prior to release month  14-Jan-2003 09-Aug-2011 ONS 104 10:30 am CET/04:30 pm EST 
ILO Unemployment M-M% change Data are for two months prior to release month  15-Jan-2003 17-Aug-2011 ONS 104 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
Quarterly        
GDP Real Advance Y-Y% change Data are for the prior quarter  24-Jan-2003 26-Jul-2011 ONS 34 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
GDP Real Preliminary Y-Y% change Data are for the prior quarter  26-Feb-2003 26-Aug-2011 ONS 35 10:00 am CET/04:00 am EST 
GDP Real Final Y-Y% change Data are for the prior quarter  27-Mar-2003 28-Jun-2011 ONS 34 10:30 am CET/04:30 am EST 
Total      1246  
 
United States Announcements  
(American Time Zone) 
Monthly         
Philadelfia Manufactoring Index Index Data are for the same month as the release month 16-Jan-2003 18-Aug-2011 FP 104 12:00 am EST/18:00 pm CET 
Consumer Confidence Index Index (1985 = 100) Data are for the same month as the release month 28-Jan-2003 26-Jul-2011 CF. B. 104 10:00 am EST/16:00 pm CET 
ISM Index  Index Data are for the previous month 02-Jan-2003 01-Aug-2011 ISM 103 10:00 am EST/16:00 pm CET 
Average Hourly Earnings USD per hour Data are for the previous month 10-Jan-2003 05-Aug-2011 BLS 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Nonfarm Payrolls Thousands Data are for the previous month 10-Jan-2003 05-Aug-2011 BLS 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Unemployment Rate % of Labour Force Data are for the previous month 10-Jan-2003 05-Aug-2011 BLS 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Retail Sales  M-M% change Data are for the previous month 14-Jan-2003 18-Aug-2011 CB 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Retail Sales less Autos Fuel M-M% change Data are for the previous month 14-Jan-2003 18-Aug-2011 CB 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Producer Price Index M-M% change, Index(1982=100) Data are for the previous month 15-Jan-2003 17-Aug-2011 BLS 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Producer Price Index (Core)  M-M% change, Index(1982=100) Data are for the previous month 15-Jan-2003 17-Aug-2011 BLS 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) M-M% change, Index(1982=100) Data are for the previous month 16-Jan-2003 18-Aug-2011 BLS 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Industrial Production M-M% change Data are for the previous month 17-Jan-2003 16-Aug-2011 FRB 104 09:15 am EST/15:15 pm CET 
Leading Indicators M-M% change Data are for the previous month 23-Jan-2003 18-Aug-2011 CF. B. 104 10:00 am EST/16:00 pm CET 
Durable Goods Orders M-M% change Data are for the previous month 28-Jan-2003 24-Aug-2011 CB 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Personal Income M-M% change Data are for the previous month 31-Jan-2003 02-Aug-2011 BEA 103 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Personal (Consumer) Spending M-M% change Data are for the previous month 31-Jan-2003 02-Aug-2011 BEA 103 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Factory Orders M-M% change Data are for two months prior to release month  07-Jan-2003 03-Aug-2011 CB 104 10:00 am EST/16:00 pm CET 
Trade Balance USD Billions Data are for two months prior to release month  17-Jan-2003 11-Aug-2011 BEA 104 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Quarterly        
GDP Real Advance Q/Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 30-Jan-2003 29-Jul-2011 BEA 35 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
GDP Real Preliminary Q/Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 28-Feb-2003 26-Aug-2011 BEA 35 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
GDP Real Final Q/Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 27-Mar-2003 24-Jun-2011 BEA 34 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
GDP Deflator Advance Q/Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 30-Jan-2003 29-Jul-2011 BEA 35 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
GDP Deflator Preliminary Q/Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 28-Feb-2003 26-Aug-2011 BEA 35 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
GDP Deflator Final Q/Q% change Data are for the prior quarter 30-Jan-2003 29-Jul-2011 BEA 34 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Weekly        
Jobless Claims Number of claims(thousands) Week-ending Saturday before the release. 02-Jan-2003 25-Aug-2011 ETA 462 08:30 am EST/14:30 pm CET 
Total      2539  
30 
  
Notes: This table presents the mean features of macroeconomic announcements issued between 01/01/2003 and 31/08/2011 for the United States, the Euro-Area, United Kingdom 
and Germany. Announcements are first classified by country or area and then by frequency of release (monthly, quarterly or weekly). The table reports the unit of measure of the 
announcements (column 2), the sequence of announcement date corresponding to data for month X (column 3), the chronological ordered starting date for each announcement 
according to its release coverage and frequency of release (column 4), the date of the last observation for the announcement (column 5), the total number of observations for each 
announcement (column 6) and the time schedule of the announcement release in Eastern Standard Time (EST) and Central European Time (CET). The global 24 trading hours day 
is decomposed in three consecutive 8-hour time-zone and each announcement is assigned to one the three time zone according to its time of release. M-M % change is the percent 
change from month to month, M-M level change is the change in level from month to month, Q/Q % change is the percent change quarter over quarter and Y/Y % change is percent 
change year over year. Actual values and median forecasts are collected from Bloomberg News Service, dates of release from Econoday Economic Calendar. The sources of 
announcements are: -for the Euro-Area: DG ECFIN, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs-European Commission; ECB, European Central Bank; ESTAT, 
Eurostat-European Commission; -for Germany: BD, Deutsche Bundesbank; DSTATIS, Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt)-German Federal Ministry of the Interior; 
IFO, Institute of Economic Research (Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung); ZEW, Centre for European Economic Research (Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung); -for the 
United Kingdom: BOE, Bank of England; GFK NPO, Gfk National Opinion Polls, London-based arm of GFK (Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung-Society for Consumer Research); 
ONS, Office for National Statistics-UK Statistics Authority; -for the United States: BEA, Bureau of Economic Analysis-U.S. Department of Commerce; BLS, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics-U.S. Department of Labor; CF. B, Conference Board; CB, Census Bureau-U.S. Department of Commerce; ETA, Labor’s Employment and Training Administration-U.S. 
Department of Labor; FP, Federal Reserve of Philadelphia; FRB, Federal Reserve Board of Governors; ISM, Institute for Supply Management. 
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Table 2 Description of unscheduled news 
 
Date Weekday Text Time-Zone 
/Sign 
Typology Source 
      
12/05/2003     Monday The dollar fell to $1.16 against the euro for the first time 
in more than four years after Treasury Secretary John 
Snow suggested (ABC Television) the U.S. isn't concerned 
with the currency's 21 percent slide in the past year. 
ATZ/P (B) BLO 
19/05/2003 Monday The dollar fell to a series of lows across the board on 
Monday after weekend comments by John Snow, the US 
Treasury secretary, were seen as underlining the US 
administration's relaxed attitude towards the dollar's fall. 
After the G7 and G8 meetings ended on Sunday, Mr Snow 
described the dollar's fall as a "modest realignment". 
ETZ/P (B) FT 
20/05/2003 Tuesday The dollar fell late Tuesday on news that the U.S. 
government decided to raise the nation's terror alert level 
back to orange, or "high," from yellow, or "elevated”. 
ATZ/P (C) WSJ 
23/05/2003 Friday The euro rose above its 1999 launch levels on Friday as 
the dollar tumbled on a combination of rising risk aversion 
on fresh terrorist fears and thin markets ahead of the long 
weekend in both the UK and the US. Its sudden move 
higher surprised traders, who said the speed was 
exacerbated by stop-loss selling - automated orders 
triggered when a currency pair reaches a particular level, 
above the euro's previous high. (in ETZ) 
ETZ/P (C,G) FT 
30/05/2003 Friday The dollar rose the most in eight weeks against the euro in 
New York trading after President George W. Bush said he 
will express support for a ‘strong dollar'’ at a weekend 
meeting of the leaders of the largest industrial nations. 
ATZ/N (D) BLO 
02/06/2003 Wednesday The dollar eased up after strengthening sharply against the 
euro in early Monday trading on supportive comments 
from President Bush over the weekend. Growing 
speculation of a more aggressive rate cut by the European 
Central Bank also fuelled the dollar's early strength. 
ETZ/N (B,G) WSJ 
11/06/2003 Wednesday The euro gained against the dollar on Wednesday as 
Eurozone officials played down the likelihood of further 
rate cuts. 
ETZ/P (B) FT 
11/06/2003 Wednesday The dollar softened against its trans-Atlantic counterparts 
on continued expectations of a U.S. interest-rate cut. 
Recent comments by Federal Reserve officials have 
fuelled speculation of a rate cut at the central bank's June 
24-25 policy meeting, with the market looking for 
additional indications Wednesday. 
ATZ/P (B) WSJ 
18/06/2003 Wednesday The dollar advanced steadily on Wednesday as investors 
lowered expectations of the likelihood of a half-point 
interest rate cut by the Federal Reserve next week 
following strong data on Monday and Tuesday 
ETZ/N (G) FT 
30/06/2003 Monday European central bankers, via the Bank for International 
Settlements, on Monday backed U.S. acceptance of a 
weaker dollar to stimulate the U.S. economy. 
ATZ/P (A) WSJ 
Notes: This table contains a sample of unscheduled news collected from various newspapers sources 
between May 2003 and June 2003. The first two columns indicate the date and weekday of release. The 
text of the news is contained in column 3. Each news is assigned to a specific time-zone and associated 
with the excepted impact on the Euro/Dollar exchange rate (column 4). The typology and the source of the 
news are showed in column 5 and 6. The (expected) effect on the euro-dollar exchange rate is the final 
character in above labels: P, Euro-positive; N, Euro-negative.WSJ: Wall Street Journal, BLO: Bloomberg 
News, FT: Financial Times. 
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Table 3  OLS estimation and stability tests  
 
Variable Coeff. Signif. S.E. p-value Hansen Stat. Signif. p-value 
  ∆Euro-Dollar{1} -0.09 *** [0.02] (0.00) 0.23   (0.21) 
  ∆Euro-Dollar{2} -0.13 *** [0.01] (0.00) 2.13 *** (0.00) 
  ∆Euro-Dollar{3} -0.02   [0.02] (0.22) 0.08   (0.67) 
  ∆10-Year US Treasury Bond -0.27 *** [0.04] (0.00) 1.44 *** (0.00) 
  ∆10-Year US Treasury Bond{1} -0.03 * [0.02] (0.07) 0.26   (0.18) 
  ∆10-Year US Treasury Bond{2} -0.05 ** [0.02] (0.03) 0.05   (0.85) 
  ∆10-Year JBG -0.07 *** [0.01] (0.00) 1.07 *** (0.00) 
  ∆10-Year JBG{1} 0.02   [0.02] (0.23) 0.47 * (0.05) 
  ∆10-Year JBG{2} -0.03   [0.02] (0.21) 0.08   (0.69) 
  ∆10-Year Bund -0.03   [0.02] (0.26) 1.32 *** (0.00) 
  ∆10-Year Bund{1} 0.10 *** [0.03] (0.00) 0.28   (0.15) 
  ∆10-Year Bund{2} 0.02 * [0.01] (0.09) 0.09   (0.64) 
  ∆Dow Jones -0.10 ** [0.04] (0.02) 3.32 *** (0.00) 
  ∆Nikkei 0.02   [0.02] (0.33) 0.65 ** (0.02) 
  ∆Nikkei{1} 0.00   [0.03] (0.91) 0.25   (0.18) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ASTZ 1.06 *** [0.09] (0.00) 0.71 ** (0.01) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ASTZ{1} -0.39 *** [0.07] (0.00) 0.71 ** (0.01) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ETZ 1.00 *** [0.04] (0.00) 6.67 *** (0.00) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ETZ{3} -0.05  [0.04] (0.20) 0.38 * (0.08) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ 1.26 *** [0.06] (0.00) 1.38 *** (0.00) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ{1} 0.21 *** [0.04] (0.00) 1.58 *** (0.00) 
  POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ{2} -0.11 ** [0.04] (0.01) 3.04 *** (0.00) 
  EUR_CPI Flash 0.26 *** [0.10] (0.00) 0.06   (0.83) 
  EUR_PPI -0.03   [0.12] (0.80) 0.12   (0.47) 
  EUR_GDP Advance 0.11   [0.14] (0.41) 0.03   (0.97) 
  EUR_GDP Advance{1} 0.28   [0.24] (0.25) 0.16   (0.36) 
  EUR_GDP Advance{2} 0.21 ** [0.09] (0.02) 0.03   (0.98) 
  EUR_GDP Preliminary 0.20 *** [0.03] (0.00) 0.02   (1.00) 
  EUR_GDP Preliminary{1} -0.07   [0.06] (0.24) 0.36   (0.10) 
  EUR_GDP Preliminary{2} -0.05   [0.05] (0.31) 0.11   (0.51) 
  EUR_GDP Preliminary{3} 0.17 ** [0.08] (0.03) 0.29   (0.14) 
  GER_IFO Expectation 0.27 *** [0.09] (0.00) 0.10   (0.55) 
  GER_IFO Expectation{1} 0.02   [0.12] (0.86) 0.09   (0.59) 
  GER_IFO Expectation{2} 0.06   [0.05] (0.19) 0.32   (0.12) 
  GER_PPI -0.14   [0.12] (0.23) 0.04   (0.93) 
  GER_PPI{1} 0.19   [0.15] (0.21) 0.21   (0.25) 
  GER_PPI{2} -0.18 * [0.10] (0.07) 0.16   (0.36) 
  UK_BOE Rate 0.18 *** [0.05] (0.00) 0.06   (0.83) 
  UK_BOE Rate{1} -0.36 ** [0.17] (0.03) 0.17   (0.32) 
  UK_BOE Rate{2} 0.09 ** [0.04] (0.01) 0.31   (0.12) 
  UK_BOE Rate{3} -0.03   [0.10] (0.74) 0.36 * (0.09) 
  UK_GDP Advance -0.05   [0.11] (0.63) 0.05   (0.87) 
  UK_GDP Advance {1} -0.20 ** [0.10] (0.04) 0.06   (0.81) 
  UK_Visible Trade Balance 0.09   [0.08] (0.27) 0.04   (0.93) 
  UK_PPI Output 0.12 * [0.07] (0.07) 0.10   (0.56) 
  UK_Unemployment Rate 0.01   [0.10] (0.90) 0.12   (0.49) 
  UK_Unmeployment Rate{1} -0.13   [0.13] (0.30) 0.05   (0.86) 
  UK_Unemployment Rate{2} -0.09   [0.06] (0.11) 0.13   (0.43) 
  UK_Unemployment Rate{3} 0.08   [0.09] (0.39) 0.08   (0.66) 
  UK_Jobless Claims -0.02   [0.13] (0.90) 0.02   (1.00) 
  UK_Jobless Claims{1} -0.24   [0.20] (0.24) 0.10   (0.59) 
  UK_Jobless Claims{2} -0.19 ** [0.10] (0.05) 0.06   (0.83) 
  UK_Jobless Claims{3} 0.03   [0.18] (0.86) 0.13   (0.43) 
  US_GDP Advance -0.48   [0.41] (0.24) 0.11   (0.51) 
  US_GDP Advance{3} 0.12   [0.11] (0.31) 0.19   (0.27) 
  US_GDP Preliminary -0.21   [0.17] (0.21) 0.14   (0.41) 
  US_GDP Preliminary{1} 0.10   [0.09] (0.24) 0.20   (0.25) 
  US_ISM Manufactoring Index -0.43 *** [0.14] (0.00) 0.49 ** (0.04) 
  US_ISM Manufacturing Index{1} 0.06   [0.05] (0.23) 0.05   (0.90) 
  US_ISM Manufactoring Index{2} -0.12 * [0.06] (0.06) 0.02   (1.00) 
  US_ISM Manufactoring Index{3} 0.09   [0.09] (0.34) 0.10   (0.56) 
  US_Nonfarm Payrolls -0.67 *** [0.26] (0.00) 0.10   (0.57) 
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  US_Producer Price Index (Core) 0.21 ** [0.09] (0.02) 0.19   (0.28) 
  Constant 0.01   [0.01] (0.41) 0.26   (0.18) 
  R2 0.36       
  Durbin Watson 1.98       
  Hansen stability test statistic        
  Joint 29.63 ***  (0.00)    
  Variance 4.23 ***  (0.00)    
  Chow stability test statistic        
  F (33, 6655) 5.33 ***  (0.00)    
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regression of intra-daily Euro/US Dollar exchange rate 
variations (∆S i,t) on interest rates yields (∆yi,t), stock market indexes returns (∆I i,t), macroeconomic 
scheduled news for Euro-Area, Germany, United States and United Kingdom, unscheduled news 
and relative lags between January 2003 and August 2011. The model is first regressed for the entire 
sample period. Only variables with significant coefficient are retained and then used in a second-
stage regression. The variables, except for unscheduled news, are standardized using the sample 
period standard deviations. Standard errors for coefficients estimates are in brackets, p-values in 
parentheses and lags 1,2 and 3 for eight, sixteen and twenty-four hours intervals are in braces. To 
assess the stability of parameter estimates, we use the Hansen’s stability test. The Hansen stability 
test is performed using a joint test statistic and individual test statistics for each parameter in the 
model. We also test the existence of a structural break using a Chow test. Data from 1-Jan-2003 to 
31-Aug-2011. (***) = statistically significant at the 1% level; (**) = statistically significant at the 
5% level; (*) = statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4 EGARCH estimations of Euro-Dollar Exchange rate 
 
 PART A. EGARCH (3,1) Sub-Period1      PART B. EGARCH (3,1)  Sub-Period2     
 01/01/2003-29/02/2008      29/02/2008-31/08/2011     
Variable Coeff. Signif. S.E. p-value Variable Coeff. Signif. S.E. p-value 
Constant 0.01   [0.01] (0.16)  Constant 0.02 *** [0.00] (0.00) 
∆Euro-Dollar{1} -0.08 *** [0.01] (0.00) ∆Euro-Dollar{1} -0.13 *** [0.01] (0.00) 
∆Euro-Dollar{2} -0.11 *** [0.01] (0.00) ∆Euro-Dollar{2} -0.03 *** [0.01] (0.00) 
∆Euro-Dollar{3} -0.03 ** [0.01] (0.01) ∆Euro-Dollar{3} -0.02 *** [0.01] (0.00) 
∆10-Year US Treasury Bond -0.31 *** [0.02] (0.00) ∆10-Year US Treasury Bond -0.19 *** [0.02] (0.00) 
∆10-Year US Treasury Bond{1} -0.03 *** [0.01] (0.00) ∆10-Year US Treasury Bond{1} -0.07 *** [0.02] (0.00) 
∆10-Year US Treasury Bond{2} -0.05 ** [0.02] (0.01) ∆10-Year US Treasury Bond{2} -0.07 *** [0.02] (0.00) 
∆10-Year  JGB -0.06 *** [0.01] (0.00) ∆10-Year JGB -0.03 *** [0.01] (0.00) 
∆10-Year  JGB{1} 0.01   [0.01] (0.36) ∆10-Year JGB{1} -0.03   [0.02] (0.18) 
∆10-Year  JGB{2} -0.03 *** [0.01] (0.00) ∆10-Year JGB{2} -0.06 ** [0.03] (0.02) 
∆10-Year Bund -0.02   [0.02] (0.28) ∆10-Year Bund 0.14 *** [0.01] (0.00) 
∆10-Year Bund{1} 0.11 *** [0.02] (0.00) ∆10-Year Bund{1} 0.15 *** [0.02] (0.00) 
∆10-Year Bund{2} 0.05 *** [0.02] (0.00) ∆10-Year Bund{2} 0.04 *** [0.01] (0.00) 
∆Dow Jones -0.05 ** [0.02] (0.03) ∆Dow Jones 0.30 *** [0.02] (0.00) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ASTZ 0.93 *** [0.05] (0.00) ∆Nikkei 0.13 *** [0.01] (0.00) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ASTZ{1} -0.36 *** [0.03] (0.00) POS_NEG Euro-Dollar _ASTZ 1.00 *** [0.01] (0.00) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ETZ 1.00 *** [0.03] (0.00) POS_NEG Euro-Dollar _ASTZ{1} -0.25 *** [0.00] (0.00) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ETZ{2} 0.09 *** [0.04] (0.00) POS Euro-Dollar _ASTZ{1} -0.12 ** [0.06] (0.05) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ 1.18 *** [0.04] (0.00) POS Euro-Dollar _ASTZ{2} -0.18 *** [0.05] (0.00) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ{1} 0.14 *** [0.04] (0.00) POS_NEG Euro-Dollar _ETZ 1.40 *** [0.03] (0.00) 
POS_NEG Euro-Dollar_ATZ{2} -0.12 *** [0.03] (0.00) POS_NEG Euro-Dollar _ETZ{2} -0.07 ** [0.03] (0.05) 
EUR_GDP Advance 0.09   [0.17] (0.59) POS Euro-Dollar _ETZ -0.09   [0.06] (0.15) 
EUR_GDP Advance{1} 0.34 ** [0.17] (0.04) POS Euro-Dollar _ETZ{2} 0.08   [0.07] (0.21) 
GER_IFO Expectation 0.26 *** [0.07] (0.00) POS_NEG Euro-Dollar _ATZ 1.25 *** [0.07] (0.00) 
UK_BOE Rate 0.10   [0.13] (0.41) POS_NEG Euro-Dollar _ATZ{2} 0.06   [0.06] (0.28) 
UK_BOE Rate{1} -0.44 *** [0.11] (0.00) POS Euro-Dollar _ATZ 0.36 *** [0.09] (0.00) 
UK_BOE Rate{2} 0.10 *** [0.02] (0.00) POS Euro-Dollar _ATZ{2} -0.08   [0.06] (0.22) 
US_ISM Manufactoring Index -0.44 *** [0.07] (0.00) EUR_PPI -0.10   [0.11] (0.39) 
US_ISM Manufactoring Index{2} -0.10   [0.08] (0.21) EUR_CPI Flash 0.03   [0.10] (0.79) 
US_Nonfarm Payrolls -0.58 *** [0.07] (0.00) EUR_CPI Flash{1} -0.15 * [0.08] (0.07) 
US_Producer Price Index (Core) 0.15 ** [0.06] (0.01) EUR_CPI Flash{2} -0.01   [0.07] (0.89) 
     EUR_CPI Flash_POS 0.10   [0.11] (0.36) 
     GER_IFO Expectation 0.23 ** [0.10] (0.01) 
     UK_BOE Rate 0.07 *** [0.00] (0.00) 
     UK_BOE Rate{2} -0.10 *** [0.02] (0.00) 
     US_GDP Advance -0.67 *** [0.19] (0.00) 
     US_GDP Preliminary -0.24 *** [0.04] (0.00) 
     US_GDP Preliminary{1} 0.09 *** [0.01] (0.00) 
     US_GDP Preliminary{2} -0.21   [0.20] (0.30) 
     US_Nonfarm Payrolls -1.04 *** [0.08] (0.00) 
     US_Producer Price Index (Core) 0.23 ** [0.09] (0.01) � -0.11 *** [0.01] (0.00) � -0.18 *** [0.02] (0.00) 
ƣ{1} 0.14 *** [0.02] (0.00) ƣ{1}  0.24 *** [0.05] (0.00) 
Ƥ{1} -0.19 *** [0.02] (0.00) Ƥ{1}  -0.45 *** [0.02] (0.00) 
Ƥ{2} 0.27 *** [0.02] (0.00) Ƥ{2}  0.73 *** [0.04] (0.00) 
Ƥ{3} 0.91 *** [0.02] (0.00) Ƥ{3}  0.71 *** [0.01] (0.00) 
φ{1} 0.02 * [0.01] (0.08) φ{1} 0.03 *** [0.02] (0.00) 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of exponential GARCH (EGARCH) estimations of intra-daily Euro/US Dollar exchange rate variations 
(∆S i,t) on interest rates yields (∆y i,t), stock market indexes returns (∆I i,t), macroeconomic scheduled news for the Euro-Area, Germany, United 
States and United Kingdom, unscheduled news and relative lags between January 2003 and August 2011. Only variables with significant 
coefficient obtained in the entire sample period OLS regression model are retained and then used in second-stage EGARCH estimations. In 
the second step the model is computed for two consecutive sub-sample periods. Panel A and Panel B report the results for the EGARCH (3,1) 
models in the first sub-period (01 January 2003 22:00 CET to 29 February 2008 at 06:00 am CET; 4040 8-hourly observations) and in the 
second sub-period (29 February 2008 at 6:00 am to 31 August 2011 22:00 CET; 2744 8-hourly observations) respectively. The variables, 
except for unscheduled news, are standardized using the sample period standard deviations. The label _POS after the macroeconomic news 
name denotes variables computed only with realized positive surprises. The label POS before the unscheduled news denotes variables computed 
only with positive expected sign on the Euro/Dollar exchange rate. Standard errors for coefficients estimates are in brackets, p-value in 
parentheses and lags 1,2 and 3 for eight, sixteen and twenty-four hours intervals are in braces. In the conditional variance EGARCH models, �  is the intercept term, ߛ௝  (j=1) is the magnitude parameter, ߜ௟ (l = 1,2,3) the GARCH parameters and �௝  (j=1) the asymmetry parameter. 
(***) = statistically significant at the 1% level; (**) = statistically significant at the 5% level; (*) = statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Effects of Unscheduled News in the Time Zones 
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 Pre-crisis (Sub-period1) 
 01/01/2003-29/02/2008 
Post -crisis (Sub-period2) 
29/02/2008-31/08/2011 
 Asia Europe USA Asia Europe USA 
    (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
Impact Effect 0.93 1.00 1.18 1.00 1.00 1.40 1.61 1.25 
Delayed reaction(s) -0.36 0.09 0.02 -0.55 -0.25 -0.07   
Net effect  0.57 1.10 1.21 0.45 0.76 1.33 1.61 1.25 
Type of effect  Over-
reaction 
Under- 
reaction 
Under-
reaction 
Over- 
Reaction 
Over-
reaction 
 
Notes: This table shows the effect of EGARCH estimated parameters of unscheduled news according the time-zone of reference. (1) are 
Euro Positive/Dollar Negative news and (2) are Euro Negative/Dollar Positive news. Over-reaction occurs when the initial effect is 
subsequently partially reverted while under-reaction occurs when the initial effect is successively reinforced. 
 
Table 6 Effects of EGARCH parameters on volatility 
 Negative unaccounted surprises    Positive unaccounted surprises 
  ��−ଵ    ��−ଵ  
  
-1 
 
-1.65 
 
2.33 
  
 +1 
 
+1.65 
 
+2.33 
Sub-period1 
01/01/2003-29/02/2008 
 
  
  
  
��଴.଴ଶ��−1 0.99 0.99 0.98  1.01 1.01 1.02 
(% effect on �ℎ� ) -0.77% -1.26% -1.78%  0.77% 1.28% 1.81% ��଴.ଵସ|��−1| 1.07 1.12 1.17  1.07 1.12 1.17 
(% effect on �ℎ� ) 7.05% 11.89% 17.20%  7.05% 11.89% 17.20% ��(଴.଴ଶ±଴.ଵସ)��−1 1.06 1.10 1.15  1.08 1.13 1.19 
(% effect on �ℎ� ) 6.23% 10.48% 15.11%  7.87% 13.32% 19.32% 
Sub-period2 
29/02/2008-31/08/2011 
       
��଴.଴ଷ��−1 0.99 0.98 0.97  1.01 1.02 1.03 
(% effect on �ℎ� ) -1.33% -2.19% -3.07%  1.35% 2.24% 3.17% ��଴.ଶସ|��−1| 1.12 1.22 1.32  1.13 1.22 1.32 
(% effect on �ℎ� ) 12.70% 21.81% 32.12%  12.70% 21.81% 32.12% ��(଴.଴ଷ±଴.ଶସ)��−1 1.11 1.19 1.28  1.14 1.25 1.36 
(% effect on �ℎ� ) 11.20% 19.14% 28.06%  14.22% 24.53% 36.31% 
Notes: This table shows the effects of EGARCH estimated parameters on the volatility of the error terms. The EGARCH (3,1) 
coefficients are taken from the estimated logarithmic equation of the conditional variance as reported in Table 4 for the two consecutive 
sub-sample periods. To quantify the effects of different sizes of unaccounted surprises we take the square root of the anti-log 
transformation of the conditional variance equations. In the EGARCH the absolute standardized innovation is centered at 0.79 (square 
root of 2/π). The simplification used in the specification affect only the constant term as showed below. The base case is ��−ଵ equal to 
zero and can be compared with the impact of the coefficient of the sign. ℎ� = exp�−0.11 − 0.14�2�� + {0.14 [|��−ଵ| ] + 0.02 (��−ଵ)}(ℎ�−ଵ)−଴.ଵ9(ℎ�−ଶ)଴.ଶ7(ℎ�−ଷ)଴.9ଵ 
 ℎ� = exp�−0.18 − 0.24�2�� + {0.24 [|��−ଵ| ] + 0.03 (��−ଵ)}(ℎ�−ଵ)−଴.ସହ(ℎ�−ଶ)଴.7ଷ(ℎ�−ଷ)଴.7ଵ
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Figure 1 Global Trading Day and Time Zones 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The 24 hours Gobal Trading Day is decomposed in three symmetric eight-hour time zones: the Asian Time 
Zone (ASTZ) goes from the closing of the US trading at 22:00 Central European Time (CET) of the previous day (t-
1) to 06:00 am Central European Time in current day (t), the European Time Zone (ETZ) starts at 06:00 am Central 
European Time when the Asian foreign market is going to close and goes to 14:00 Central European Time. The 
American Time Zone (ATZ) goes from 14:00 Central European Time (equivalent to 08:00 am Eastern Standard Time, 
EST) to 22:00 Central European Time (or 16.00 Eastern Standard Time). Exchange rate closing quotes at 05:00 am, 
13:00 and 21:00 Central European Time are taken by hourly series. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Recursive Residuals and Standard Error Band 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows the recursive residuals and the upper and lower recursively generated standard error bands. 
The recursive residuals are obtained from recursive Least Squares estimations. If there is a break, the residuals will lie 
outside the band until the coefficients or the variance estimates adjust. 
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